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ORIGINALISM, THE WHY AND THE WHAT
Larry Alexander*
This paper is short and simple—like its author. It is short because its
points can be made quickly, and I have elaborated on them at some length
in many prior writings.1 It is simple because the truth about interpretation,
that its aim is to understand what an author or authors intended to
communicate, is a simple truth. Indeed, as you read what follows, you will
be trying to understand what I, in writing what follows, intend to get you to
understand. And in doing so, you will be confirming my simple thesis. But
I’m getting ahead of myself.
1. In all tenable theories about the nature of law, there is a place for the
following story. We do not agree about what we ought to do, but we do
agree that we need to settle the matter. So we designate a person or group
of people to decide what norm or norms should govern us with respect to
the matters in dispute.2 That person might be a chief executive; that group
might be a legislature or a constitutional convention. Regardless, their job
in all cases is to come up with norms in order to settle what is to be done in
some domain of social life.
2. Now, after this person or group has decided on the appropriate
norms to govern the matter, they then must communicate to the rest of us
what those norms are. For their job was not merely to settle the matter
among themselves. It was to settle the matter for all of us. So they are
faced with the following task: they must express the norms they have
chosen in such a way that the rest of us understand what those norms are.

* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I want to thank Will
Baude, Stanley Fish, Steve Smith, and the participants in The New Originalism in
Constitutional Law Symposium.
1. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING
131–232 (2008) [hereinafter ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING];
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 96–122 (2001) [hereinafter
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES]; Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The
Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions,” in LAW AND INTERPRETATION
(Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re
Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
967 (2004); Larry Alexander, Of Living Trees and Dead Hands, 22 CANADIAN J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 227 (2009); Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 87, 87–98 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011);
Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (2010); Larry Alexander, What
Are Constitutions, and What Should (and Can) They Do?, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 15–19
(2010).
2. See, e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011); ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, THE RULE OF
RULES, supra note 1, at 11–36.
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Because we cannot ascertain the norms they have in mind through
telepathy, they must communicate them through symbols—orally, using
sounds; in writing, using marks; through semaphore, using flags; by smoke
signals, and so forth.
3. The job of the rest of us—the interpreters—is to discover what
norms the group or person we tasked with choosing the norms actually
chose. In other words, in Gricean terms,3 our job is to determine the uptake
the legislator(s) intended us to have. Why would we choose a legislator to
come up with norms to settle what ought to be done if, after the legislator
does so, we do not attempt to understand what the legislator is trying to
communicate?
4. Here, then, is what follows from the foregoing: The meaning of the
norm that the legislative person or body has chosen and communicated
symbolically is the meaning that person or body intends those symbols to
communicate. Whether we are talking about a constitutional provision, a
statute, an administrative rule, an executive order, or a judicially
promulgated rule, its meaning, for purposes of the legal enterprise, is its
authorially intended meaning—in Gricean terms, its speaker’s meaning.4
Any meaning it is given other than its authorially intended meaning renders
nonsensical the idea of designating its authors as having the authority to
determine the norms to govern us. For the norms that they determined just
are the norms that they are communicating, and the symbols that they
choose for that purpose—however aptly or inaptly—must be deemed to
mean what they intended them to mean, in order for the norms that they
chose to govern us to succeed in governing us. That means we must seek
the authorially intended meaning of the symbols, or the uptake the authors
intended.
5. The meaning of a legal norm is just its authorially intended meaning.
That is the simple truth of originalism. (I put to the side cases where the
legal norm is a “standard” that must be given content by someone other
than the legislator.
Interpretation, properly called, ends with the
determination that the legislator intended the norm to be a standard.
Originalism gets one only to that point. Giving content to the standard is
not interpretation, but is first-order reasoning. The legislator did not settle
what ought to be done, but delegated that job to other decisionmakers.)

3. Gricean refers to the principles of the linguistic philosophy of Paul Grice. See
generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989).
4. I regard speaker’s meaning as primary and Gricean utterance meaning as derivative
and secondary. Indeed, utterance meanings are just what most speakers intend by particular
symbols. They are time, place, and audience relative. And if one’s audience knows that you
use particular symbols nonstandardly—the audience knows you are speaking in code, or
using an idiolect, or are “misusing” the symbols (because you believe that their standard
meaning is something other than what it is)—than those symbols mean to the audience what
you intended them to mean; for you have succeeded in getting the uptake you intended,
which shows that the symbols you used were apt given your audience. To have utterance
meaning defeat speaker’s meaning would render lawmaking “mindless.”
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(a) The authorially intended meaning (the Gricean speaker’s meaning)5
is not the same thing as the authorially intended applications. The latter are
evidence, and often strong evidence, of the former, but the two are not the
same thing.
(b) The authorially intended meaning might turn on the authors’
reference—the thing they are referring to—rather than their criteria or
“sense”—their definition of that thing. Such might be the case where their
norms refer to “poisons” or to “death.” On the other hand, the authorially
intended meanings of some norms might elevate sense over reference—as,
for example, if a premodern statute forbade taking “fish” from a bay, and
the legislators thought of whales as fish.6
(c) Authorially intended meaning is not the “original public meaning”
(OPM), whatever the latter is. OPM either reduces to authorially intended
meaning or, if at odds with it, undermines the legal enterprise. OPM is
supposed to be the meaning that would be inferred by a hypothetical
reasonable person existing contemporaneously with the promulgation of the
norm. For OPM proponents, that hypothetical person’s uptake is the
meaning of the norm. However, that hypothetical person cannot be
nonarbitrarily constructed: Is the person a he or a she? Does he or she live
in the city or the country? How much education and of which kind has he
or she had? How much information does he or she possess about the law in
question and the reasons behind its promulgation, etc.? Moreover, even if
that hypothetical person could be nonarbitrarily constructed, the meaning
that person should be seeking is the authorially intended meaning. (That
follows from the points made earlier.) Presumably, then, advocates of
OPM are positing a failure to discover the authorially intended meaning and
the substitution of a different norm from the norm that the legislators chose
to enact. But why have legislators if we are going to ignore their enacted
norms and substitute instead norms that a hypothetical person would have
mistakenly thought the legislators enacted?
(d) The motivations behind OPM seem to be two.7 One is a sense that it
is somehow unfair to declare that the enacted norm is different from what a
reasonable person at the time of enactment would have thought it to be.8
But that concern is confused. If we discover today that a norm has a
different meaning from what people in the past took it to mean, there is no
unfairness in correcting course and going with the new meaning. No one is
going to be punished for a reasonable misunderstanding by a hypothetical
person. Nor does it follow that flesh and blood people will be punished for
5. See GRICE, supra note 3, at 117–37.
6. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 1,
at 148–49.
7. I have heard a third motivation voiced, namely, a concern that the authors might
have a secret intended meaning that they wish to conceal from their audience. That concern
rests upon a confusion, however. The authorially intended meaning just is the audience
uptake that the authors intend. A secret authorially intended meaning is an impossibility.
8. In the case of the Constitution, if the reasonable person at the time of enactment is a
ratifier, then his or her understanding is germane. But that is because he or she is really the
author of the Constitution.
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or prejudiced by reasonable misunderstandings. (We have doctrines to deal
with reasonable misinterpretations.) Although it is probably a rare event
when a later interpreter has better evidence of the authorially intended
meaning than the legislator’s contemporaries, it can and probably does
happen. And there is nothing unfair about declaring the interpretations of
reasonable contemporaries to have been mistaken.
(e) The other principal motivation behind OPM is to avoid the problem
of attributing a single authorially intended meaning to a law that is the
product of a multimember body. Unlike the fairness “problem,” collective
authorship is a problem for authorially intended meaning. On occasion,
there will be little or no shared meaning behind a shared set of symbols. A
simple example can stand in for all the cases. Suppose there are three
legislators, and they enact laws by majority vote. The text of the law they
vote on reads, “There shall be no meetings by the bank.” Legislator A
votes “aye” and believes that “bank” refers to the river bank. He is in favor
because he thinks meetings there are hazardous due to frequent flooding.
Legislator B votes “aye” and believes “bank” refers to the town’s financial
institution. She is in favor because meetings there interfere with the bank’s
customers’ comings and goings. And let us suppose, for whatever reasons,
legislator A would have voted “no” had he believed “bank” referred to the
financial institution, and legislator B would have voted “no” had she
believed “bank” referred to the river bank. Legislator C, a libertarian, votes
“no” and would vote “no” on either meaning of “bank.” The law passes
two to one. What does it forbid?
I would say that despite the appearance of being meaningful, the law has
no authorially intended meaning. It is gibberish.9 Each of the legislators
has an authorially intended meaning; but because the law requires at least
two authors, the law itself has no authorially intended meaning.10
But here’s the point. OPM cannot help here. For suppose the
hypothetical reasonable person knows all the facts. He or she is going to
come to the same conclusion as I just did, namely, that the so-called law is
gibberish.
6. To say that the meaning of a law is its authorially intended meaning
is not to say that discovering that meaning will be an easy matter.
Sometimes it will be, but sometimes it won’t. Indeed, sometimes it will be
difficult for the author herself to determine her intended meaning. That
difficulty will typically arise in cases where what appears to be the
originally intended meaning of a law has an unforeseen application that is at
odds with the purpose behind the law. If the author of the law is asked what
meaning she intended with respect to such a case, she might respond in one
of four ways:
9. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 1, at
171–73.
10. Richard Ekins has argued that legislatures and their procedures can be structured in
ways that prevent such failures of authorially intended meaning. See generally RICHARD
EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012). That may be true, but not all legislative
bodies are so structured.
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(a) I intended the law to cover such a case, even though I didn’t foresee
it, because I intended the law to be a bright-line rule, and I realized it would
be overinclusive to some extent. Indeed, because I intended the law to be a
bright-line rule, I would not have amended it even if I had foreseen this
application.
(b) I intended the law to cover this kind of case because I did not foresee
the perniciousness of this application. But now that I see that this
application is pernicious, I regret having intended the law to cover it.
Nonetheless, although I now regret it, my intended meaning does cover it.
(c) The application of the law in this case is so pernicious or absurd that
I surely did not intend its meaning to cover this case. (Consider the
hypothetical of the boss who orders a subordinate “to remove all the
ashtrays” because an important client is coming who abhors smoking. The
boss is unaware that there are some ashtrays built into the walls. The
subordinate duly rips those out, leaving gaping holes.11 The boss might
truthfully say, “I didn’t intend that” by my instruction.)
(d) Finally, there will possibly be some cases where the author cannot
say what she intended with respect to the unforeseen application.
7. The last point raises one of the great philosophical mysteries about
following authorial intent, whether by the interpreter or by the author
herself. That is the so-called Kripkenstein problem. How can we infer
from the finite content of the author’s mind at the time of the utterance the
norm that will make it true that something is the intended meaning in an
indefinite number of future applications?12 I offer no solution to this muchdebated philosophical puzzle. But I am confident that although I cannot
explain them, there are truths about intended meanings that cover an
indefinite number of applications not present in the mind of the author at
the time of the utterance.
* * *
Authorially intended meanings are what originalism is properly seeking.
And that quest is properly the job of anyone who must interpret the
promulgations of legal authorities. To ignore their authorially intended
meanings is to undermine the enterprise that the authorities are engaged in,
which is to settle for us the norms that should guide us. For that reason,
originalism of the authorially intended meanings variety is really the only
game in town.13

11. Kent Greenawalt gives a similar hypothetical in which a manager tells a subordinate
to shut the manager’s door and the subordinate does so in the face of the company’s
president, who was on his way to see the manager. KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND
OBJECTIVITY 13–16 (1992); see also ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL
REASONING, supra note 1, at 141–45 (giving other similar examples).
12. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 1, at
160–65.
13. Of course, we can ignore the authorially intended meanings if we don’t like them, in
which case we have become the authors of the legal norms, not those whose symbols we
might appropriate to convey our meanings. That describes a revolution, a change of the rule
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of recognition, albeit a peaceful one. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of
Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on
Acceptance, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 175 (Matthew D.
Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009).

